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How far Has the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda Really Come since 
Akayesu in the Prosecution and Investigation of Sexual Offences Committed 
against Women? An Analysis of Ndindiliyimana et al. 
 
Helen Trouille 
University of York 
 
Abstract 
During the first trial before the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), 
that of Jean-Paul Akayesu, it became evident that many Tutsi and moderate Hutu 
women had been raped, that “rape was the rule and its absence was the exception”.1 
Although, initially, not a single charge of sexual violence was proffered against 
Akayesu, presiding judge Navanethem Pillay interrupted the proceedings, allowing 
ICTR prosecutors to amend the indictment and include counts of rape and sexual 
violence. Akayesu subsequently became the first case to recognise the concept of 
genocidal rape. 
 
However, post-Akayesu, comparatively few defendants appearing before the ICTR 
have been convicted of sexual violence. An analysis of the recent case of 
Ndindiliyimana et al
2
 reveals that major shortcomings beset the investigation and 
prosecution procedures, so that crimes of sexual violence go unpunished, although 
                                                 
1
 Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Rwanda submitted by Mr R Degni-Ségui, Special 
Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights under paragraph 20 of resolution S-3/1 of 25 May 
1994 (29 Jan 1996) E/CN4/1996/68, para. 16, quoted in UN Division for the Advancement of 
Women Rome Department of Economic and Social Affairs Sexual Violence and Armed Conflict: 
United Nations Response (April 1998) p. 16. 
2
 Prosecutor v. Ndindiliyimana et al, 17 May 2011, ICTR-00-56-T, Judgment and Sentence. 
 2 
research suggests that adequate legislation is in place at the ICTR to prosecute rape 
and sexual violence successfully.  
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1. Introduction 
 
In 2005, Binaifer Nowrojee, a former researcher for HRW/Africa and expert witness 
on sexual violence in the Government II trial,
3
 lamented the poor performance of the 
ICTR in the prosecution of crimes of sexual violence: on the tenth anniversary of the 
genocide, Nowrojee calculated that “only two defendants had specifically been held 
responsible for their role in sexual violence crimes” committed during the genocide.4 
This conclusion is alarming when set in the context of a genocide where, 
according to René Dégni-Ségui, Special Rapporteur of the United Nations 
Commission on Human Rights, rape was “systematic and was used as a ‘weapon’ by 
                                                 
3
 Prosecutor v. Casimir Bizimungu et al ‘The Government II Trial’, 8 July 2005, ICTR-99-50-T 
Decision on the admissibility of the expert testimony of Dr Binaifer Nowrojee, para. 14 citing 
Prosecutor v. Semanza, 20 May 2005, ICTR-97-20-A, Appeal Judgment, para. 303. 
4
 “No rape charges were even brought by the Prosecutor’s Office in 70 per cent of those adjudicated 
cases. In the 30 per cent that included rape charges, only 10 per cent were found guilty for their role 
in the widespread sexual violence. Double that number, 20 per cent, were acquitted because the 
court found that the prosecutor did not properly present the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt. 
In real numbers, that means that, at the tenth anniversary of the genocide, only two defendants 
had specifically been held responsible for their role in sexual violence crimes (a third conviction was 
reversed on appeal), despite the tens of thousands of rapes committed during the genocide.3 As of 
April 2004, none of the rape acquittals had been appealed by the prosecutor. How can this be?” 
Binaifer Nowrojee, United Nations Research Institute for Social Development (UNRISD) Policy 
Report on Gender and Development: 10 Years after Bejing, “Your justice is Too Slow”: Will the 
ICTR Fail Rwanda's Rape Victims? Occasional Paper Ten (published 15/11/2005)  16 
<www.unrisd.org/unrisd/website/document.nsf/0/56FE32D5C0F6DCE9C125710F0045D89F? Open 
Document> accessed 23 January 2013. 
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the perpetrators of the massacres” and “according to consistent and reliable testimony, 
a great many women were raped; rape was the rule and its absence was the 
exception.”5 Nowrojee’s frustrations at the paucity of rape convictions are easy to 
understand. 
It is a generally accepted fact that vast numbers of women were raped. Dégni-
Ségui informs us that the Ministry for the Family and the Promotion of Women 
recorded 15,700 cases of women raped during the genocide.
6
 Yet this figure, already 
distressing enough, appears to belie reality.
 
For medical professionals in Rwanda 
believe that between two and five thousand pregnancies occurred as a direct result of 
the sexual violence during the genocide. Given that statistics show that just one 
pregnancy will result from one hundred cases of rape, this would suggest that there 
could have been between 200,000 and 500,000 instances of rape, and
 
it is Dégni-
Ségui’s estimate that between 250,000 and 500,000 women (out of a total population 
of seven million
7
) were raped during the Rwandan genocide.
8
  
Despite the obvious sexual violence, and despite the fact that this had been 
highlighted at regular intervals in the previous ten years, convictions for sexual 
violence continued to be relatively few and far between. In November 2008, only 
thirty-six of the eighty-seven people indicted for crimes committed during the 
genocide had been charged with rape or sexual violence. Of thirteen completed cases 
involving an indictment for rape in 2008, nine accused were acquitted of charges of 
rape or sexual violence and only four found guilty.
9
 Furthermore, a report compiled 
                                                 
5
 Degni-Ségui, supra note 1, para 16. 
6
  Ibid, para 16. 
7
 United Human Rights Council, Genocide in Rwanda) <www.unitedhumanrights.org/genocide/ 
genocide_in_rwanda.htm> accessed 19 April 2012. 
8
 Degni-Ségui, supra note 1, para 16. 
9
 Linda Bianchi, Roundtable on Cooperation between the International Criminal Tribunals and National 
Prosecuting Authorities, Arusha, 26 to 28 November 2008, The investigation and presentation of 
evidence relating to sexual violence is in the interest of justice, para 9 <ictr-
archive09.library.cornell.edu/ENGLISH/international_cooperation/papers_presented/sexual-
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by Gabriel Oosthuizen, Executive Director of International Criminal Law Services,
10
 
at the request of the Division for Policy, Evaluation and Training of the United 
Nations’ Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), states that, of twenty-four 
cases completed before the ICTR by March 2009, only thirteen contained sexual 
violence agreed facts.
11
 There appears, therefore, to be, at least until 2009, a 
worryingly persistent trend which prevents sexual violence against women being 
punished before the ICTR.  
Yet the widespread sexual violence had been brought to the attention of the 
Trial Chamber in the very first case to appear before it, that of Jean-Paul Akayesu, 
bourgmestre (mayor) of Taba commune, which concluded on 2
nd
 September 1998.
12
 
This was the first time an international tribunal had enforced the United Nations 1948 
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.
13
 The first 
person to be convicted by the ICTR, Akayesu was also the first person ever to be 
convicted by an international tribunal of sexual violence as an instrument of 
genocide.
14
 In addition, Akayesu was the first person to be convicted of rape as a 
crime against humanity, and, in the absence of a clear definition of rape in 
                                                                                                                                            
violence. pdf> accessed 24 January 2013, who refers to the ICTR-OTP Synopsis on charging and 
convictions for rape, June 2008. 
10
 International Criminal Law Services is an organisation providing legal and technical training and 
advice relating to war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide <www.iclsfoundation.org/> 
accessed 23 January 2013. 
11
 Gabriel Oosthuizen, Review of the Sexual Violence Elements of the Judgments of the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, and 
the Special Court for Sierra Leone in the Light of Security Council Resolution 1820 (Division for 
Policy, Evaluation and Training of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, 1 September 2010) 
<www.unrol.org/files/32914_Review%20of%20the%20Sexual%20Violence%20Elements%20in%2
0the%20Light%20of%20the%20Security-Council%20resolution%201820.pdf> accessed 23 January 
2013. 
12
 Prosecutor v. Akayesu, 2 September 1998, ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment and Sentence. 
13
 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Adopted 9 December 
1948, entered into force 12 January 1951) 78 UNTS 277 (Genocide Convention). 
14
 ‘Akayesu, Jean-Paul’ (Academic Research, The Hague Justice Portal) available at http://www. 
haguejusticeportal.net/index.php?id=8778 (last visited 20 December 2012). 
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international law,
15
 the Akayesu Trial Chamber was moved to articulate the elements 
of the offence, providing the first definitions of rape and sexual violence under 
international law. 
16
 
Despite this ruling – truly groundbreaking, since rape is not specifically listed 
as one of the prohibited acts which may constitute genocidal acts –  and the first 
conviction in international law of a woman on rape charges, Pauline Nyiramasuhuko, 
in June 2011,
17
 even Linda Bianchi, senior appeals counsel at the ICTR’s Office of 
the Prosecution (OTP), has been led to admit the conviction rate for crimes of sexual 
violence at the ICTR is poor in comparison to rates for other crimes.
18
  
Criticisms made for low conviction rates at the ICTR for acts of sexual 
violence have in the past revolved typically around issues of poor performance by key 
ICTR staff.  
This article attempts to assess whether these accusations still have any basis in 
fact and whether they continue to affect the outcomes of cases before the ICTR. It 
analyses the 2011 trial of Ndindiliyimana et al,
19
 which is currently under appeal, to 
evaluate critically the principal shortcomings in the prosecution and investigation of 
sexual offences committed against women during the Rwandan genocide and attempts 
to identify why certain charges of sexual violence failed. The study focuses on the 
performance of ICTR staff – judges, prosecutors and investigators. 
                                                 
15
 Mark Ellis, ‘Breaking the silence: rape as an international crime’, 38 Case Western Reserve Journal 
of International Law (2007) 225, 229. 
16
 Kelly D Askin ‘Sexual Violence in Decisions and Indictments of the Yugoslav and Rwandan  
Tribunals: Current Status’, 93 The American Journal of International Law (1999) 97, 107. 
17
 Prosecutor v. Nyiramasuhuko et al, 24 June 2011, ICTR-98-42-T, Judgment and Sentence, paras. 
5828-5836. 
18
 Bianchi, supra note 9. 
19
 Prosecutor v. Ndindiliyimana et al, Judgment and Sentence, supra note 2.  
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The article opens with a description of current legislation used to prosecute 
crimes of sexual violence laid out in the ICTR Statute
20
 and its interpretation in 
Akayesu. Paragraphs from the Tribunal’s Rules of Procedure and Evidence (governing 
the conduct of the pre-trial phase) pertinent to the prosecution of sexual violence 
crimes are highlighted, such as the admission of evidence and protection of witnesses 
and victims. Key case law from the ICTR and International Criminal Tribunal for the 
Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) providing definitions of the elements of rape and sexual 
violence is also resumed.  
 
 
2. Key ICTR Legislation and Case Law 
2.1 Provisions Regarding Rape and Sexual Violence in the ICTR Statute and 
interpretation by the Akayesu Trial Chamber  
 
The ICTR statute provides several different routes to prosecute rape and sexual violence 
committed during the genocide, and during the trial of Jean-Paul Akayesu, the 
interpretation of these was debated at length.  
On the original indictment against Akayesu, which numbered twelve counts of 
genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes committed in Taba, no gender-
related crimes had been entered at all, even though, at that stage, it was well-known 
that rape crimes had been committed systematically. When Witness J testified about 
the gang rape of her six-year-old daughter by three Interahamwe (Hutu militia) and 
                                                 
20
 Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for 
Genocide and Other Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the 
Territory of Rwanda and Rwandan Citizens Responsible for Genocide and Other Such Violations 
Committed in the Territory of Neighbouring States, between 1 January 1994 and 31 December 1994 
(Adopted by Security Council Resolution 955 of 8 November 1994, Amended by Security Council 
resolutions 1165 of 30 April 1998, 1329 of 30 November 2000, 1411 of 17 May 2002 and 1431 of 14 
August 2002). 
 7 
informed the Trial Chamber she had also heard of many other rapes, and Witness H 
gave evidence that she herself had been raped and had been a witness to other rapes, 
Judge Navanethem Pillay, the only female judge amongst the nine elected ICTR 
judges, suspended Akayesu’s trial in May 1997.21 Following further evidence that 
vast amounts of rapes and sexual violence had taken place in Taba in the presence of 
Akayesu, the indictment was amended to include charges of rape (Count 13) and 
inhumane acts (Count 14) as crimes against humanity, charges of outrages upon 
personal dignity, in particular rape, degrading and humiliating treatment and indecent 
assault, contravening Common Article 3 and Article 4 (2) (e) of Additional Protocol II 
(Count 15), and charges of genocide accompanied by acts of sexual violence (Counts 
1-3).
22
 It is undoubtedly largely due to Judge Pillay’s considerable expertise as a 
specialist in women’s rights that gender crimes were given the prominence that they 
were in Akayesu’s trial.23 
The provisions in the ICTR statute to prosecute rape and sexual violence are 
found in Articles2, 3 and 4.  
Article 2 (2) of the ICTR prohibits genocide, although it does not specifically 
name sexual violence as a genocidal act.
24
 In its celebrated decision, the Akayesu Trial 
                                                 
21
 Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Judgment and Sentence, supra note 12, para 416-417. 
22
 Prosecutor v. Akayesu, 17 June 1997, ICTR-96-4-I, Amended Indictment, Counts 1-3. 
23
 Co-founder of the South African Advice Desk for Abused Women (1986) and of Equality Now 
(1992), an international women's rights organisation (<http://www.equalitynow.org/ >accessed 2 
March 2013). 
24
 ICTR Statute Article 2  Genocide  
1. The International Tribunal for Rwanda shall have the power to prosecute persons committing 
genocide as defined in paragraph 2 of this article or of committing any of the other acts 
enumerated in paragraph 3 of this article.  
 2. Genocide means any of the following acts committed with the intent to destroy, in whole or 
part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such:  
(a) killing members of the group;  
(b) causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;  
(c) deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical 
destruction in whole or part;  
(d) imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;  
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.   
3. The following acts shall be punishable:  
 8 
Chamber ruled that rape and sexual violence could constitute acts of genocide “in the 
same way as any other act as long as they were committed with the specific intent to 
destroy, in whole or in part, a particular group targeted as such”.25 Although not 
expressly mentioned in article 2 (2), the Trial Chamber ruled that rape and sexual 
violence could be prosecuted as acts of genocide under article 2 (2) (a) Killing members 
of a group,
26
 under article 2 (2) (b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members 
of the group,
27
 under article 2 (2) (d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births 
within the group,
28
 and under article 2 (2) (e) Forcibly transferring children of the group 
to another group.
29
 
For its part, Article 3, which refers to crimes against humanity, grants the 
ICTR the power to prosecute persons responsible for rape (article 3 (g)) and other 
inhumane acts (article 3 (i)) when committed as part of a widespread or systematic 
attack against any civilian population on national, political, ethnic, racial or religious 
grounds.
30
  
                                                                                                                                            
( a ) Genocide;  
( b ) Conspiracy to commit genocide;  
( c ) Direct and public incitement to commit genocide;  
( d ) Attempt to commit genocide;  
( e ) Complicity in genocide.  
25
 Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Judgment and Sentence, supra note 12, para 731. 
26
 “It appears clearly to the Chamber that the acts of rape and sexual violence, as other acts of serious 
bodily and mental harm committed against the Tutsi, reflected the determination to make Tutsi 
women suffer and to mutilate them even before killing them, the intent being to destroy the Tutsi 
group while inflicting acute suffering on its members in the process”. Ibid, para 733. 
27
 “Indeed, rape and sexual violence certainly constitute infliction of serious bodily and mental harm on 
the victims… Sexual violence was an integral part of the process of destruction”. Ibid, para 731. 
28
 “In patriarchal societies, where membership of a group is determined by the identity of the father, an 
example of a measure intended to prevent births within a group is the case where, during rape, a 
woman of the said group is deliberately impregnated by a man of another group, with the intent to 
have her give birth to a child who will consequently not belong to its mother's group”. Ibid, para 507. 
29
 “With respect to forcibly transferring children of the group to another group, the Chamber is of the 
opinion that, as in the case of measures intended to prevent births, the objective is not only to 
sanction a direct act of forcible physical transfer, but also to sanction acts of threats or trauma which 
would lead to the forcible transfer of children from one group to another”. Ibid, para 509. 
30
 ICTR Statute, Article 3  Crimes against humanity 
 The International Tribunal for Rwanda shall have the power to prosecute persons responsible for 
the following crimes when committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack against any 
civilian population on national, political, ethnic, racial or religious grounds: 
(a) Murder; 
 9 
  In addition to the specific elements of each individual crime, the perpetrator 
must possess the requisite mens rea, knowingly having committed the crime, for it to 
be judged as a crime against humanity; the perpetrator should have had “actual or 
constructive knowledge of the broader context of the attack, meaning that the 
Accused must know that his act(s) is part of a widespread or systematic attack on a 
civilian population and pursuant to some kind of policy or plan”.31 Isolated acts 
carried out for purely personal reasons are thus excluded. It is not necessary that the 
rapes themselves should have been widespread or systematic in order for them to 
amount to a crime against humanity; the requirement is that they form a part of the 
widespread or systematic attack against the civilian population, on national, political, 
ethnic, racial or religious grounds.
32
  
As mentioned above, Akayesu’s conviction for rape as a crime against 
humanity produced the first definition of the legal elements of rape at an international 
judicial forum: “a physical invasion of a sexual nature, committed on a person under 
circumstances which are coercive”33 – a broad definition with no attempt to define 
rape in the more mechanical terms common to many national jurisdictions, since: 
The Chamber considers that … the central elements of the crime of rape cannot be captured in a 
mechanical description of objects and body parts.
34
 
 
A more traditional definition of rape along terms of non consensual sexual  
intercourse was felt to be too narrow, since the Trial Chamber wished to include 
                                                                                                                                            
(b) Extermination; 
(c) Enslavement; 
 (d) Deportation; 
 (e) Imprisonment; 
 (f) Torture; 
 (g) Rape; 
(h) Persecutions on political, racial and religious grounds; 
(i) Other inhumane acts 
31
 Prosecutor v. Kayeshima and Ruzindana, 21 May 1999, ICTR-95-1-T, Judgment, paras. 133-134. 
32
 Kelly Dawn Askin, ‘Gender Crimes jurisprudence in the ICTR: positive developments’ 3 Journal of 
International Criminal Justice (2005) 1007, 1011. 
33
 Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Judgment and Sentence, supra note 12, para 598. 
34
 Ibid, para 597. 
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clearly under the definition of rape “acts which involve the insertion of objects and/or 
the use of bodily orifices not considered to be intrinsically sexual”, for example 
thrusting a piece of wood into the sexual organs of a woman as she lay dying.
35
 
The Akayesu Trial Chamber also defined sexual violence, which falls within the 
scope of ‘other inhumane acts’ (Article 3 (i)), as well as ‘serious bodily or mental harm’ 
(Article 2 (2) (b)) and ‘outrages upon personal dignity’ (Article 4 (e)).36 Article 4 of the 
ICTR Statute reiterates Article 3 Common to the Geneva Conventions and of its 
Additional Protocol II, and enables the prosecution of rape and sexual violence (Article 
4(e)) as war crimes.
37
 
Sexual violence, which includes rape, is defined in Akayesu as: 
 “any act of a sexual nature which is committed on a person under circumstances which are 
coercive and as part of a wide spread or systematic attack, on a civilian population or on certain 
catalogued discriminatory grounds, namely: national, ethnic, political, racial, or religious 
grounds.”38  
 
The indictment further clarified that “acts of sexual violence include forcible 
sexual penetration of the vagina, anus or oral cavity by a penis and/or of the vagina or 
anus by some other object, and sexual abuse, such as forced nudity”.39 In its ruling, 
the Trial Chamber specified clearly that sexual violence did not need to involve 
                                                 
35
 Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Judgment and Sentence, supra note 12, para 686. 
36
 Ibid, para 688. 
37
 ICTR Statute, Article 4 Violations of Article 3 Common to the Geneva Conventions and of 
Additional Protocol II  
 The International Tribunal for Rwanda shall have the power to prosecute persons committing or 
ordering to be committed serious violations of Article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions of 
12 August 1949 for the Protection of War Victims, and of Additional Protocol II thereto of 8 
June 1977. These violations shall include, but shall not be limited to:  
 (a) Violence to life, health and physical or mental well-being of persons, in particular murder as 
well as cruel treatment such as torture, mutilation or any form of corporal punishment;  
 (b) Collective punishments;  
 (c) Taking of hostages;  
(d) Acts of terrorism;  
 (e) Outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment, rape, 
enforced prostitution and any form of indecent assault;  
(f) Pillage;  
(g) The passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without previous judgement 
pronounced by a regularly constituted court, affording all the judicial guarantees which are 
recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples;  
(h) Threats to commit any of the foregoing acts.  
38
 Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Judgment and Sentence, supra note 12, para 598. 
39
 Prosecutor v. Akayesu, 17 June 1997, ICTR-96-4-I, Amended Indictment para 10A. 
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penetration of the human body or even physical contact, and gave the example of a  
student forcibly undressed by the Interahamwe (members of the Hutu militia) and 
made to do gymnastics naked in front of a crowd.
40
 
The mens rea for establishing outrages upon personal dignity is that the 
Accused intentionally committed or participated in an act or omission which would 
generally be considered to cause serious humiliation, degradation or otherwise be a 
serious attack on human dignity, and that he knew that the act or omission could have 
that effect.
41
 In Musema, the ICTR added “subjecting victims to treatment designed to 
subvert their self-regard” to the definition of humiliating and degrading treatment.42 
The issue of coercive circumstances was also debated by the Akayesu Trial 
Chamber. The Trial Chamber deemed that coercion was “inherent in certain 
circumstances, such as armed conflict”,43 thus removing the necessity for the victim to 
prove that she had not consented to the sexual violence, a major step in a climate in 
which many victims must not have dared to resist their assailants.
44
 
This stance was further debated at some length in the case of Gacumbitsi, and 
the Appeal Chamber confirmed the ruling that: 
It is not necessary…for the Prosecution to introduce evidence concerning the words or conduct 
of the victim or the victim’s relationship to the perpetrator. Nor need it introduce evidence of 
force. Rather, the Trial Chamber is free to infer non-consent from the background 
circumstances, such as an ongoing genocide campaign or the detention of the victim.
45
 
 
                                                 
40
 Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Judgment and Sentence, supra note 12, para 688. 
41 Angela M Banks Sexual Violence and International Criminal Law: an Analysis of the Ad Hoc 
Tribunal’s Jurisprudence and the International Criminal Court’s Elements of Crimes (Women’s 
Initiatives for Gender Justice, Amsterdam 2005) 40-41, citing Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Kovac, Vukovic, 
22 February 2001, ICTY, IT-96-23-T and IT-96-23/1-T, Judgment, para. 514. 
42
 Prosecutor v. Musema, 27 January 2000, ICTR-96-13, Judgment and Sentence, para. 285. 
43
 Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Judgment and Sentence, supra note 12, para 688. 
44
 “The Tribunal notes in this context that coercive circumstances need not be evidenced by a show of 
physical force. Threats, intimidation, extortion and other forms of duress which prey on fear or 
desperation may constitute coercion, and coercion may be inherent in certain circumstances, such as 
armed conflict or the military presence of Interahamwe among refugee Tutsi women at the bureau 
communal”. Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Judgment and Sentence, supra note 12, para 688. 
45
 Prosecutor v. Gacumbitsi, 7 July 2006, ICTR-2001-64-A, Appeal Judgment, para 155. 
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If an Accused raises reasonable doubt by introducing evidence that the victim 
consented, then the Trial Chamber is free to disregard the evidence if it concludes that, 
under the circumstances, the consent given is not genuinely voluntary.  
In addition to these important provisions, the ICTR and ICTY have also 
provided Rules of Procedure and Evidence which are very supportive of the victims 
of rape and sexual violence. The Rules govern the conduct of the pre-trial phase of the 
proceedings, trials and appeals, and matters such as the admission of evidence and the 
protection of victims and witnesses.  
In matters of sexual violence, the most significant of the Rules of Procedure 
and Evidence is Rule 96, which states that no corroboration of the victim’s testimony 
shall be required. It also states that, as a defence to the charges, an accused shall not 
be allowed to rely on the fact that the victim gave consent to a sexual act, in cases 
where the victim was subjected to or threatened with or had reason to fear violence, 
duress, detention or psychological oppression, or if she reasonably believed that 
someone else might be subjected to these if she did not submit. To protect the victim’s 
identity and reputation – essential steps if victims are to be encouraged to testify – 
before evidence of the victim’s consent to a sexual act is admitted to the Trial 
Chamber, the Accused is required to satisfy the Trial Chamber in camera that the 
evidence is relevant to the case and credible. Evidence as to the prior sexual conduct 
of the victim is quite simply not to be admitted in evidence or as a defence under any 
circumstances.
46
  
Akayesu was finally found guilty of rape as a crime against humanity (Count 
13). The Trial Chamber also found that forced nudity constituted an inhumane act
47
 
                                                 
46
 International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda Rules of Procedure and Evidence (adopted 29 June 
1995, entered into force 29 June 1995) UN Doc ITR/3/REV 1, Rule 96 (iv). 
47
 Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Judgment and Sentence, supra note 12, para 688. 
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and convicted Akayesu for inhumane acts as a crime against humanity (Count 14).
48
 
The conviction for genocide emphasised that Akayesu had encouraged his men to 
rape Tutsi women to destroy them physically and mentally (Count 1),
49
 and that many 
women and girls were killed or had died as a result of injuries inflicted on them in the 
course of rapes.
50
 
Thus, judicial interpretation of the Statute during the Akayesu trial, which 
formally acknowledged the use of rape and sexual violence as a means of wreaking 
destruction across an entire ethnic group, supported by solid Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence, ensured that mechanisms were in place for the successful prosecution of the 
many instances of rape and sexual violence committed during the genocide – as acts 
of genocide themselves, as specific crimes against humanity or as war crimes. 
 
2.2 The Elements of Rape and Sexual Violence Further Defined through Case Law 
Certain subsequent cases have been significant in assisting the ICTR to define further 
the crimes of rape and sexual violence in an international context: Kayishema and 
Ruzindana, Musema, Semanza, Gacumbitsi and Muhimana. 
 
2.2.1 Kayishema and Ruzindana 
In the joint trial of Clément Kayishema and Obed Ruzindana, which concluded on 21 
May 1999, the Trial Chamber concurred, in its discussion on genocide, with the views 
expressed in Akayesu, that “acts of sexual violence, rape, mutilations and 
interrogations combined with beatings, and/or threats of death, were all acts that 
amount to serious bodily harm”51 and could thus constitute an act of genocide under 
                                                 
48
 Ibid, Verdict. 
49
 Ibid, paras 452, 731-734. 
50
 Ibid, para 449. 
51
 Prosecutor v. Kayeshima and Ruzindana, Judgment and Sentence, supra note 31, para. 108. 
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Article 2 (2) (b) of the ICTR statute if carried out with the intention to cause harm to 
members of an ethnic group with intent to destroy that group in whole or in part. The 
Trial Chamber also ruled that deliberately inflicting on an ethnic group conditions of 
life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part (Article 2 (2) 
(c)) included methods of destruction which do not immediately lead to the death of 
members of the group, and that rape was one of these conditions of life, provided that 
it would lead to the destruction of the group in whole or in part.
52
 Thus this all-male 
panel of judges extended further the scope of genocide elaborated by the Akayesu 
judges. 
Most regrettably, despite the numerous acts of rape and sexual violence 
mentioned in the Judgment,
53
 once again the indictment contained no charges of 
sexual violence, focusing rather on the use of “guns, grenades, machetes, spears, 
cudgels and other weapons to kill the people.”54 Consequently, the Accused could not 
be convicted of sexual violence. However, the gravity of the sexual violence was 
confirmed in the judges’ obiter dicta. As Kelly Dawn Askin highlights, the courtroom 
testimony and subsequent references to the crimes “ensures that the historical record 
of the crimes committed is more accurately reflected,” acknowledging that these 
crimes inflicted “enormous devastation” and formed part of the genocide.55 
 
2.2.2 Musema 
The Musema Trial Chamber, which reached its verdict on 27 January 2000, also 
confirmed the broad definition of rape elaborated in Akayesu,
56
 understandably, since 
it was presided again by Judge Pillay. It referred to “a trend in national legislation to 
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broaden the definition of rape” and stated “that the Chamber considers that a 
conceptual definition is preferable to a mechanical definition of rape. The conceptual 
definition will better accommodate evolving norms of criminal justice”.57 The 
Akayesu definition had also been endorsed in November 1998 by the ICTY in the 
Delalić case,58 where the Trial Chamber added that rape can constitute torture under 
certain circumstances.
59
 However, subsequent to Delalić and prior to Musema, the 
ICTY judges in the trial of Anto Furundžija (concluded on 10 December 1998), 
appeared to find that the conceptual definition in Akayesu did not provide elements 
precise enough to define rape, declaring that “no definition of rape can be found in 
international law.”60 
The Furundžija Trial Chamber chose to examine the principles of criminal law 
common to the major legal systems of the world to find an exact definition of rape, 
which would satisfy the criminal law principle of nullum crimen sine lege stricta.
61
 
The Furundžija Trial Chamber thus concluded that the objective elements of rape 
consisted of: 
(i) the sexual penetration, however slight: 
(a) of the vagina or anus of the victim by the penis of the perpetrator or any other object used by 
the perpetrator; or 
(b) of the mouth of the victim by the penis of the perpetrator; 
(ii) by coercion or force or threat of force against the victim or a third person.
62
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Judge Pillay, committed to the definition which the Akayesu trial Chamber had 
outlined, opined in Musema that “the definition of rape, as set forth in the Akayesu 
Judgement, clearly encompasses all the conduct described in the definition of rape set 
forth in Furundzija,”63 encapsulating the Furundzija definition within the broader 
Akayesu definition. 
However, on appeal, although it did not contest the definition of rape, the 
Musema Appeals Chamber demanded a high burden of proof for rape
64
 and 
overturned Musema’s conviction for the rape of a young unmarried teacher called 
Nyiramusugi.
65
 The Chamber did not dispute that she had been raped, but stated that 
the evidence presented in two out-of-court statements from Witnesses CB and EB 
conflicted with the testimony put to the Trial Chamber by prosecution Witness N, and 
gave grounds for reasonable doubt that Musema, and not someone else, was guilty of 
Nyiramusugi’s rape on the day in question.  
A high burden of proof was also demanded by the Trial Chamber at first 
instance when Musema was charged with rape as a crime against humanity for 
encouraging his men to rape Tutsi women.
66
 Due to inconsistencies in witness 
testimony, the Trial Chamber found that the Prosecution had failed to prove beyond 
reasonable doubt that “any act of rape…had been committed by Musema’s 
subordinates and that Musema knew or had reason to know of this act and he failed to 
take reasonable measures to prevent the said act”.67 Witness J, mother of five 
children, accused Musema and his men of raping and killing her eighteen-year-old 
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daughter in Bisesero. However, she had told the Trial Chamber several times that her 
three oldest children, who were aged twenty-five, twenty-three and nineteen, had been 
killed by Charles Sikubwabo, bourgmestre of Gishyita, before she fled to Bisesero, 
and that her only children alive at the time she fled to Bisesero were aged twelve and 
nine. She was unable to explain this inconsistency to the Trial Chamber, which 
therefore questioned the accuracy of her account in respect of her daughter’s rape. 
The Trial Chamber was reluctant to disbelieve her account, since it found her 
testimony to be “generally credible,” and considered “that there is likely to be a 
reasonable explanation [for the inconsistency], based on its evaluation of the 
witness”.68 The Trial Chamber concluded: 
recalling the high burden of proof on the Prosecutor and the lack of any other evidence 
produced to corroborate the account of Witness J, the Chamber cannot find beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the allegations have been established.
69
 
 
The broad definition of rape laid down in Akayesu was therefore accepted, but the 
Trial chamber imposed a high evidential burden on the Prosecution to bring about a 
successful conviction. 
 
2.2.3 Semanza 
Three years later, in the case of Laurent Semanza, a narrower and more mechanical 
definition of rape was adopted. The all-male Semanza Trial Chamber, which reached 
its verdict on 15 May 2003, followed the ICTY Appeals Chamber’s decision in the 
2001 case of Kunarac,
70
 which was influenced by the ICTY case of Furundžija.  
The Kunarac Trial Chamber accepted the actus reus of rape as definined in 
Furundžija under paragraph (i), but felt that further clarification was required 
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regarding the issue of coercion under paragraph (ii) and considered the matter of 
consent in some detail. 
To clarify the issues of coercion and consent, the Trial Chamber carried out a 
detailed examination of the definition of rape in several major national jurisdictions. 
The Kunarac Trial Chamber followed Furundžija, also including oral sex as rape, but 
stipulated that the free will of the victim to consent must be assessed in accordance 
with the surrounding circumstances, and that this should not be interpreted in a 
narrow or restrictive way, since it is unlikely a victim would refuse to consent to a sex 
act in the prevailing circumstances. The mens rea was understood to be the intention 
to effect the sexual penetration, in the knowledge that it occurred without the consent 
of the victim.
71
 The Kunarac Appeals Chamber summed up the situation with regard 
to consent and force in rape charges. It was of the view that “serious violations of 
sexual autonomy are to be penalized”,72 and stated that the absence of consent was the 
conditio sine qua non of rape, and force or threat of force provided clear evidence of 
non consent. However, it made clear that force is not an element per se of rape; there 
could be “factors other than force which would render an act of sexual penetration 
non-consensual or non-voluntary on the part of the victim.”73 The Appeals Chamber 
observed that a narrow, too literal focus on the use of force or threat of force to make 
a victim consent to a sex act could potentially permit perpetrators to evade liability for 
sexual activity to which the other party had not consented, if the aggressor took 
advantage of the pervading climate of fear and did not need to use actual physical 
force.
74
 It agreed with the Trial Chamber’s determination that the coercive 
circumstances present in Yugoslavia at the time meant that victims were highly 
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unlikely to have consented, of their own free will, to the sex acts which they had 
endured.
75
 This was a major step in eliminating the issue of consent as an evidentiary 
factor in crimes of sexual violence before the ICTY.
76
 A plea that the victim had 
consented was unlikely to be considered a plausible defence to rape. 
Although not binding on the ICTR, ICTY case law holds persuasive authority. 
Thus, despite accepting that a mechanical definition of rape was rejected by the ICTR 
in Akayesu, and was subsumed into the definition in Musema, the Semanza Trial 
Chamber followed Kunarac and Furundžija and defined the actus reus of rape as a 
crime against humanity as: 
the non-consensual penetration, however slight, of the vagina or anus of the victim by the penis 
of the perpetrator or by any other object used by the perpetrator, or of the mouth of the victim 
by the penis of the perpetrator. Consent for this purpose must be given voluntarily and freely 
and is assessed within the context of the surrounding circumstances.
77
 
 
The Semanza Trial Chamber recognized that other acts of sexual violence not 
satisfying this narrower definition of rape could be prosecuted as other crimes against 
humanity within the jurisdiction of the ICTR, such as torture, persecution, 
enslavement, or other inhumane acts. It concluded that the mens rea for rape as a 
crime against humanity was the intention to effect the prohibited sexual penetration, 
with the knowledge that it occurred without the consent of the victim.
78
  
Rebecca Haffajee, a lawyer who worked as a legal intern in the ICTR in 2004, 
saw this as a retrograde step. She felt that the ICTY had made it clear that the 
surrounding circumstances of conflict rendered it likely a victim would not have 
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consented to the sexual act. In her opinion, the ICTR in Semanza demanded evidence 
of the lack of consent of the victim in order to find an accused guilty of rape.
79
 
Semanza was charged with two counts of rape as a crime against humanity 
(Counts 8 and 10) and two as a war crime violating Common Article 3 (Counts 9 and 
13). Rape crimes were also mentioned in counts for persecution and torture. He was 
found guilty of one count of rape as a crime against humanity (Count 10)
80
 but 
acquitted of the other due to ‘insufficient notice’ being given to the Accused (Count 
8).
81
 He was found not guilty of the rape offences charged under Common Article 3: 
Count 13, as it was considered the rape charge was already covered under Count 10,
82
 
and Count 9 as the Prosecutor had failed to introduce any evidence of the occurrence 
of the rapes.
83
 Semanza was also convicted of torture as a crime against humanity by 
encouraging the crowd to rape Tutsi women, leading to the rape of Victim A (Count 
11).
84
 Although the rapes were considered to have been widespread and were 
mentioned frequently in the indictment, Semanza was only convicted of one specific 
rape, that of Victim A, as it was not proved that the other rapes had taken place at his 
instigation, with his knowledge and without the consent of the victims. 
The extent to which it was necessary to prove lack of consent of the victim 
arose again in Gacumbitsi. 
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2.2.4 Gacumbitsi  
On 17 June 2004, Sylvestre Gacumbitsi was found guilty of genocide, and 
extermination and rape as a crimes against humanity, each including sexual violence. 
It was established in court that Gacumbitsi drove around with a megaphone, urging 
Hutu young men whom Tutsi girls had refused to marry to “have sex with the young 
girls”, adding that if “they [the young girls] resisted, they had to be killed in an 
atrocious manner”.85 The Trial Chamber concluded that the order given by 
Gacumbitsi to attack and select rape victims was discriminatory on grounds of 
ethnicity, since only Tutsi girls were targeted. The victims’ lack of consent to the sex 
acts was established by the fact that Gacumbitsi had exhorted men to kill ‘in an 
atrocious manner’ those who resisted them, and also by the fact that the victims were 
attacked by those from whom they were fleeing.
86
 This constituted rape as a crime 
against humanity (Article 3 (g)), the Trial Chamber, presided over by female judge 
Andresia Vaz, claiming to apply both the Akayesu and Kunarac Appeal Chamber’s 
definitions of rape: 
The Chamber is of the opinion that any penetration of the victim’s vagina by the rapist with his 
genitals or with any object constitutes rape, although the definition of rape under Article 3(g) of 
the Statute is not limited to such acts alone.
87
  
 
The Trial Chamber also found that the rapes committed had caused serious 
bodily harm to members of the Tutsi ethnic group and were thus an act of genocide 
under ICTR Statute Article 2 (2) (b). In defining serious bodily or mental harm, the 
Trial Chamber stated: 
Serious bodily harm means any form of physical harm or act that causes serious bodily injury to 
the victim, such as torture and sexual violence. Serious bodily harm does not necessarily mean 
that the harm is irremediable. Similarly, serious mental harm can be construed as some type of 
impairment of mental faculties, or harm that causes serious injury to the mental state of the 
victim.
88
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The Trial Chamber also emphasised that many women and girls died as a 
result of rape, notably by inserting sticks into their genitals, incorporating this into the 
extermination conviction (Article 3 (b)).
89
 
At appeal in 2006, the Gacumbitsi Appeals Chamber followed the more 
specific Kunarac Appeal Judgment’s definition of rape, with no reference to the broad 
definition in Akayesu, focussing rather on issues of consent. It concluded that non-
consent and the knowledge of lack of consent were elements of rape, and that the 
Prosecution therefore bore the burden of proving these elements beyond reasonable 
doubt in order to obtain a conviction.
90
 Rule 96 of the ICTR’s Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence refers to consent as a defence which the Accused may plead and does not 
allow consent to be admitted as a defence if the victim has been subjected to, 
threatened with or put in fear of violence, duress, detention or psychological 
oppression or has reasonably believed that someone else might be so subjected, 
threatened or put in fear. If it was acceptable to plead as a defence that the victim had 
consented to the sex act, then the burden of proof would shift to the Defendant, who 
would need to produce evidence that the victim had consented to the sex act. 
However, the Kunarac Appeal Judgment declared this approach not “entirely 
consistent with traditional legal understandings of the concept of consent in rape”.91 It 
ruled that, rather than turning what was essentially an element of the offence (‘non-
consent’) to be proved by the Prosecution, into a defence, Rule 96 should be 
interpreted as outlining the circumstances under which evidence of consent of the 
victim would be admissible from the Accused. The Gacumbitsi Appeals Chamber, 
although accepting the burden of proof lay with the Prosecution, underlined that the 
Prosecution could prove non-consent of the victim beyond reasonable doubt by 
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proving the existence of coercive circumstances under which meaningful consent was 
not possible.
92
 Therefore, if the Accused raised reasonable doubt by introducing 
evidence that the victim consented, then the Trial Chamber was at liberty to disregard 
the evidence if it concluded that, under the surrounding circumstances of genocide, 
the consent given was not genuinely voluntary. Furthermore, as to the Accused’s 
knowledge of the absence of consent of the victim, this could be proven if the 
Prosecution were able to establish beyond reasonable doubt that the Accused was 
aware, or had reason to be aware, of the coercive circumstances that undermined the 
possibility of genuine consent on the part of the victim in the context of the 
genocide.
93
 
 
2.2.5 Muhimana 
In the 2005 case of Mikaeli Muhimana, who was also found guilty of rape as an act of 
genocide and a crime against humanity, the Trial Chamber endorsed the Akayesu 
definition of rape.
94
 The Trial Chamber noted that Akayesu’s conceptual definition of 
rape had not been universally adopted in subsequent case law of the ICTR and ICTY, 
and that rape had also been interpreted with reference to physical elements of the act. 
The Muhimana Trial Chamber, under the guidance of presiding judge Khalida Khan, 
an eminent female judge who has published on women’s rights,95 considered that the 
Kunarac definition served to “specify the parameters of what constitutes ‘a physical 
invasion of a sexual nature’”,96 and, as the Musema trial judges did, managed to 
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combine the definitions given in both Akayesu and Kunarac, despite their apparent 
conflict: 
Furundžija and Kunarac, which sometimes have been construed as departing from the Akayesu 
definition of rape…actually are substantially aligned to this definition and provide additional 
details on the constituent elements of acts considered to be rape. The Chamber takes the view 
that the Akayesu definition and the Kunarac elements are not incompatible or substantially 
different in their application.
97
  
 
However, even with the benefit of the expanded definition, the Trial Chamber did not 
find that the disemboweling of a victim by cutting her open with a machete from her 
breasts to her vagina constituted an act of rape. Although acquiescing that the act 
interfered with the sexual organs, the Chamber clarified that, in its opinion, the 
disemboweling did not constitute a physical invasion of a sexual nature
98
 but instead 
represented murder as a crime against humanity. On this occasion, one might argue 
that murder carries a heavier penalty than rape, but it remains to be seen whether the 
refusal to view this as an act of sexual violence will have any repercussions on the 
interpretation of rape as an international crime in the future. 
The Chamber went on to concur with the opinion that circumstances 
prevailing in most cases charged under international criminal law would be almost 
universally coercive, thus vitiating true consent as a defence to rape.
99
 
Muhimana appealed against his conviction. He raised the matter of 
“uncorroborated circumstantial evidence” and contested the validity of witness 
testimony with regard to the rape of two Tutsi girls. Witness AP had not actually been 
an eyewitness to the rape and could therefore not establish the actus reus of rape. 
Witness AP had seen the girls taken into Muhimana’s house, heard them scream that 
they did not expect the Accused “to do that” and emerge “stark naked … walking 
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‘with their legs apart’”.100 In 2007, the Appeals Chamber ruled that it was permissible 
to base a conviction on circumstantial evidence. This was confirmed previously in the 
Gacumbitsi, Kajelijeli, Niyitegeka and Rutaganda Appeals,
101
 where it was stated that 
a Trial Chamber may prefer to hear corroboration of a witness statement, but neither 
the case law of the ICTR nor of the ICTY made this an obligation. If testimonies were 
divergent, it was the duty of the Trial Chamber hearing the witnesses to decide which 
evidence it deemed to be more probative, and to choose which of the versions of the 
same event it would admit. This has allowed considerable freedom of movement to 
ICTR judges in their assessment of evidence. However, the conviction for these two 
rapes was overturned by the Appeals Chamber in 2007: the rapes were indeed deemed 
to have taken place, but the Accused had not been the only person present in the 
house at the time, and it was not possible to be sure beyond reasonable doubt that it 
was Muhimana who had committed them. 
The definition of rape preferred in Muhimana was not applied by the ICTR in 
Ndindiliyimana et al
102
 in 2011. The mechanical definition of the actus reus for rape 
used in Gacumbitsi and Kunarac, and subsequently Nyiramasuhuko et al,
103
 was used 
by the Trial Chamber, as was the mens rea (the intention to effect the sexual 
penetration, in the knowledge that it occurred without the consent of the victim
104
), 
and the position regarding consent of the victim, which should be given voluntarily 
and freely, assessed within the context of the surrounding circumstances, force or 
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threat of force providing evidence of non-consent, but not being an element per se of 
rape (see Section 2.2.5).
 105
 
The efforts made by the Muhimana Trial Chamber to reconcile the Akayesu 
and Kunarac definitions of rape, reiterated in Hategekimana in December 2010,
106
 
appear to have been abandoned, at least temporarily, in favour of a purely mechanical 
definition, despite the presence of a female judge, Taghrid Hikmet, on benches both 
of Ndindiliyimana et al and Hategekimana. 
It cannot be disputed that there is now a structure in place to prosecute rape 
and sexual violence committed during the Rwandan genocide. The provisions of the 
ICTR statute coupled with the definition of rape and sexual violence elaborated by 
succeeding Trial Chambers provide a framework to prosecute sexual offences against 
women during the genocide. However, defendants continue to be acquitted on charges 
of rape and sexual violence if the face of vigorous accusations against them. 
The following paragraphs consider factors other than the definition of the 
offences which may be preventing the successful prosecution of rape and sexual 
violence at the ICTR, focussing on the case of Ndindiliyimana et al.
107
 
 
 
3. Defective Indictments, Inadequate Evidence and Dubious Investigative 
Practices  
 
In the recent case of Ndindiliyimana et al,
108
 there were successful convictions for 
some of the rape charges but not for others. A close study of the Ndindiliyimana et al 
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trial reveals failings on the part of prosecutors and investigators and suggests a 
diffidence on the part of judges to accept charges of sexual violence. 
 
3.1 Focus on Ndindiliyimana et al 
The Trial Chamber in the case of Augustin Ndindiliyimana, Augustin Bizimungu, 
François-Xavier Nzuwonemeye and Innocent Sagahutu delivered its verdict in May 
2011. It is currently under appeal. Nzuwonemeye, Bizimungu and Sagahutu were 
charged with  Rape as a Crime Against Humanity (Count 6) and Rape as a Violation 
of Common Article 3 (Count 8). Although all were found guilty of certain offences, 
only Augustin Bizimungu was found guilty of Count 6 (Rape as a Crime Against 
Humanity) and Count 8 (Rape as a Violation of Common Article 3). Even then, he 
was not found guilty of all the rapes of which he stood accused.  
The reasons given by the Trial Chamber for rejecting some significant charges 
put forward by the Prosecution are outlined below. 
 
3.1.1 Flawed Indictments 
It appears that, alarmingly frequently, even when rape and sexual violence are 
charged, and it is accepted that the offences did occur, they are not pleaded in such a 
way as to enable the Trial Chamber to conclude beyond reasonable doubt that the 
accused are guilty of them.
109
 
 
3.1.1.1   Dates of rapes outside of time period pleaded 
The Ndindiliyimana et al indictment alleged that Rwandan Army soldiers caused 
serious bodily or mental harm to Tutsi women at different locations from mid-April to 
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late June 1994, while Augustin Bizimungu was Chief of Staff of the Rwandan Army, 
notably at the Josephite Brothers’ compound in Kigali on 8 April 1994. Although 
Count 3 (Complicity in Genocide) of the indictment
110
 does not specifically allege 
that soldiers committed rapes at the locations identified, the Trial Chamber 
recognized, following the 2008 Seromba Appeal judgment, that nearly all convictions 
for causing serious bodily or mental harm involved rapes or killings.
111
 Bizimungu 
was therefore deemed to have had sufficient notice that the alleged acts of violence 
causing serious bodily or mental harm in paragraphs 68 and 69 of the Indictment 
included rapes, in order to prepare his defence. Furthermore, the Trial Chamber also 
noted that the Prosecution Closing Brief had specifically included rape within the 
notion of “serious bodily or mental harm” for the purposes of the genocide charge.112  
The Trial Chamber found that the Prosecution had proved beyond reasonable 
doubt that Rwandan Army soldiers killed and caused serious bodily and mental harm 
to Tutsi at the Josephite Brothers’ compound on 8 April 1994,113 particularly the rape 
of a twenty-year-old girl, whose body had been found the following day,
114
 although 
rape was not specifically charged under Count 3, and events at the Josephite Brothers’ 
compound had been omitted from Counts 6 (Rape as a Crime against Humanity) and 
8 (Violation of Common Article: rape). However, Bizimungu was only appointed 
Chief of Staff, and promoted to Major General, on 16 April 1994, and occupied this 
office from 19 April. Thus, these rapes fell outside the time period prescribed in the 
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indictment: his period in office, mid April to late June 1994. The Trial Chamber, 
consequently, refused to even consider the allegations dated 8 April 1994 in assessing 
Bizimungu’s responsibility for rape as an act of genocide, as a superior, since he was 
not in office at the time.
115
  
Furthermore, although this was considered regrettable, Bizimungu could not 
even be held criminally responsible for failing to punish the crimes afterwards: 
current case law
116
 precludes finding superiors responsible for failing to punish crimes 
committed before they assumed the position of command over the perpetrators.
117
 We 
may reasonably ask whether the wrong person was charged with this offence. 
However, Bizimungu’s immediate predecessor as Chief of Staff was General 
Deogratias Nsabimana, who was in President Juvénal Habyarimana’s aeroplane, shot 
down on 6 April 1994 – the event provoking the genocide. This took place two days 
before the attacks at the Josephite Brothers’ compound. Bizimungu did occupy a 
position of responsibility in the military at the time of events at the Josephite 
Brothers’ compound, having been appointed commander of military operations for the 
Ruhengeri secteur in January 1994.
118
 But the ICTR did not hold him responsible for 
atrocities taking place in Kigali. Charging him with offences for which he could not 
be prosecuted as they fell outside the time period prescribed in the indictment as his 
period in office as Chief of Staff and outside his geographical sphere of influence as 
commander of military operations for the Ruhengeri secteur in early April 1994 was a 
waste of valuable ICTR resources by prosecution staff.  
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3.1.1.2   Improper pleading of events in Butare  
Bizimungu was also charged with responsibility as a superior for causing serious 
bodily and mental harm including rape (Count 2) in Butare, from 19 April to late June 
1994.
119
 However the Trial Chamber noted that “the Prosecution failed to sufficiently 
particularise and adequately specify the exact locations at which crimes were alleged 
to have been committed and observed…” within the three-month date range, so that 
“an objective reader of the Indictment would not be able to decipher where exactly the 
alleged crimes were observed … and consequently what were the nature and 
circumstances of the crimes alleged at these locations”.120 The pleading was 
“defective” with respect to the crimes alleged in Butare, Gisenyi, Cyangugu, Kibuye 
and Ruhengeri, and the “defects were not cured”.121 The lack of precision would have 
prevented Bizimungu from preparing an adequate defence to the charges and deprived 
him of a fair trial. Consequently, he could not be tried for the alleged rapes in Butare.  
Pursuant to the ICTR Statute, an accused must be informed promptly and in 
detail of the nature and cause of the charges against him.
122
 The Prosecution must 
plead the facts and offence in the indictment with precision,
123
 including the 
relationship of the accused to his subordinates, the acts and crimes of the 
subordinates, how the accused should know that his subordinates had committed the 
crimes and how he failed to prevent the crimes or punish his subordinates. Failure to 
plead the material facts in the indictment with sufficient specificity constitutes a 
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defect in the indictment.
124
 Previous ICTY and ICTR case law is clear on this,
125
 
stating that a defective indictment may cause the Appeals Chamber to reverse a 
conviction.
126
 In Bizimungu, the Prosecution should have supported its allegations by 
specific evidence regarding the exact crimes and locations in which they were 
committed in the indictment, against which Bizimungu could prepare a defence. 
The genocide charges in Count 2 included rapes committed at Gishamvu 
Church, Nyumba Parish, Butare, and at the Kicukiro conseiller’s office, however the 
Prosecution failed to lead any evidence at all regarding the alleged crimes at those 
locations,
127
 and those offences could not be prosecuted. 
 
3.1.2 Evidence 
The quality and quantity of the evidence presented to the Trial Chamber was not 
always adequate to secure a conviction for rape or sexual violence on each occasion 
that it was charged. 
 
3.1.2.1 Hearsay, Circumstantial Evidence and Absence of Corroboration 
With regard to the charges under Count 6 (Rape as a crime against humanity) against 
Bizimungu, Nzuwonemeye and Sagahutu, the Chamber found the Prosecution had not 
presented sufficient evidence to prove soldiers of the Rwandan Army, under the 
command of Nzuwonemeye and Sagahutu, committed rapes against Tutsi women at 
the Centre Hospitalier de Kigali (Kigali Hospital Complex – CHK), the only offences 
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of sexual violence against Nzuwonemeye and Sagahutu. Witness DAR was the only 
Prosecution witness to testify about rapes perpetrated by soldiers against Tutsi girls at 
CHK. The Trial Chamber did not find Witness DAR’s evidence adequate to convict 
the accused beyond reasonable doubt. His evidence was indirect – he had not 
witnessed the rapes himself. In his testimony, he inferred that the Tutsi girls had been 
raped because he had seen “the sad demeanour of the Tutsi girls when they returned 
to CHK after having been abducted by soldiers.”128 In view of the prevalence of rape 
during the genocide, witness DAR’s conclusions were potentially well-founded. 
Circumstantial evidence is very often the principal evidence available in a criminal 
trial, from which a judge or jury must reach a verdict. However, Witness DAR’s 
evidence was not only circumstantial but also uncorroborated by reliable witnesses. 
The only other witness to testify to the Trial Chamber about the killings at the CHK 
was Witness ZA, who, although testifying about abductions from the wards, did not 
mention rapes, and whose evidence was also indirect. The Trial Chamber considered 
it insufficiently detailed to be corroborative of any rapes. 
Witness DAR also gave evidence, based on information communicated to him 
from three colleagues,
129
 about the abduction and murder of a young Tutsi woman 
named Chantal, however his colleagues were not called to testify, which constitutes 
hearsay. Under English criminal law, hearsay is only admissible as evidence under 
certain specific circumstances, as witnesses should normally be available for cross-
examination in court.
130
  In contrast, the ICTR does not exclude hearsay evidence.
131
 
Clearly, locating victims and witnesses can be difficult due to deaths and changes of 
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address engendered by the events of 1994. Furthermore, many Rwandans have been 
left unfit to testify physically or mentally, or are afraid of testifying for fear of 
reprisals.  
English law also accepts that hearsay evidence is valuable in these 
circumstances, and allows its admission under sections 114-118 of the Criminal 
Justice Act 2003 (CJA). Notably, section 116 includes exceptions to the rule against 
hearsay, which permit relevant hearsay statements to be admitted if the person who 
made the statement is identified to the court’s satisfaction, for example, statements 
made by eyewitnesses who have since died,
132
 by witnesses unfit because of their 
bodily or mental condition,
133
 by witnesses who have left the country and it is not 
reasonable to call them back,
134
 by those who cannot be traced despite reasonable 
attempts to locate them
135
 or, with leave of the court, by witnesses too afraid to testify 
in person.
136
 
At the ICTR, the Rules of Procedure and Evidence allow any evidence to be 
admitted provided it is relevant and has probative value.
137
 Hence, Witness DAR’s 
hearsay evidence relating to the murder of Chantal was admissible. Corroboration is 
not required either, in order for evidence to be admissible, there being “no place for 
the Civil Law principle unus testis, nullus testis…”138 in the ICTR. 139 
                                                 
132
 Section 116 (2) (a) Criminal Justice Act 2003. 
133
 Section 116 (2) (b) Criminal Justice Act 2003. 
134
 Section 116 (2) (c) Criminal Justice Act 2003. 
135
 Section 116 (2) (d) Criminal Justice Act 2003. 
136
 Section 116 (2) (e) Criminal Justice Act 2003. 
137
 International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda: Rules of Procedure and Evidence (entered into force 
29 June 1995) UN Doc ITR/3/REV, 1 Rule 89 (C). 
138
 ‘one witness is no witness,’ Kriangsak Kittichaisaree, International Criminal Law (OUP, New York 
2001) 302;  see Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Judgment and Sentence, supra note 12, paras. 132-7. 
139
 “The Chamber also recalls that the testimony of a single witness on a material fact does not, as a 
matter of law, require corroboration. However, where a single witness gives testimony concerning a 
particular incident, the Chamber recalls that it must act with particular care before accepting such 
evidence on its own when making a finding of guilt”. Prosecutor v. Ndindiliyimana et al, Judgment 
and Sentence, supra note 2, para. 112 citing Prosecutor v. Muvunyi, 11 February 2010, ICTR-00-
55A-T, Judgment and Sentence, para. 128. 
 34 
Circumstantial evidence is treated similarly, and, consequently, a conviction 
could actually be based solely on uncorroborated circumstantial evidence and/or 
hearsay. Nonetheless the Trial Chamber, as the trier of fact, can decide that, under 
particular circumstances, corroboration is necessary,
140
 and judges have the discretion 
to treat hearsay evidence with caution and expect corroboration.
141
 The Chamber may 
freely assess the relevance and credibility of all evidence presented to it.
142
 Hearsay 
evidence is admissible to the Chamber, and is only rejected if it lacks credibility 
rather than because it constitutes hearsay, however, in the interests of a fair trial, it 
was reasonable to expect satisfactory identification of Witness DAR’s colleagues, in 
order for the hearsay evidence to be admissible. In this particular situation, although 
not obliged by the ICTR’s Rules of Procedure and Evidence to require corroboration 
of witness DAR’s testimony, given the indirect and limited nature of his evidence, the 
judges decided not to accept his evidence without corroboration.
143
 
The cases of Kamuhanda, Kajelijeli, Musema and Niyitegeka, where rape 
charges failed, demonstrate that establishing the credibility of hearsay and 
circumstantial evidence is not straightforward. For each prosecution witness who 
testified about rapes in these cases, the witnesses and the overall testimony they gave 
were deemed credible by the Trial Chambers, but when they gave hearsay or 
circumstantial evidence, this was not deemed credible.
144
 This leads Daniel Franklin 
to conclude that “establishing the credibility of a witness is insufficient to establish 
the credibility of hearsay or circumstantial evidence from that same witness.”145 
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Franklin highlights a significant problem for the Prosecution: “None of these 
judgments [Kamuhanda, Kajelijeli, Musema and Niyitegeka] suggested what would be 
required to establish the credibility of hearsay or circumstantial evidence…. It thus 
falls upon the prosecutor to ensure that the hearsay or circumstantial evidence is itself 
credible”.146  
Catherine MacKinnon, the International Criminal Court’s (ICC) Special 
Adviser for Gender Affairs since 2008, speaks of “a tacit social burden of proof”,147 
according to which corroboration is required to a greater extent for sexual assault 
cases than for other offences. She feels that “at both prosecutorial and judicial levels, 
a tacitly higher standard of credibility for witnesses to rape pertains than for witnesses 
to murder”, citing Kajelijeli148 as an example of a case where the bench (Judge Arlette 
Ramaroson dissenting) appeared reluctant “to hold a man responsible for a sexual 
violation another man committed, when it is willing to hold the same man responsible 
for murder committed on virtually the same evidence, at the same time and place, by 
and against the same people”.149  
There are clear reasons why Trial Chambers hesitate to accept uncorroborated 
hearsay and circumstantial evidence: hearsay statements are not made under oath, can 
be misreported in court and the speaker of the original statement cannot be cross-
examined. Circumstantial evidence, for its part, can lead to a conviction based upon 
flawed assumptions. In Ndindiliyimana et al, in contrast to testimony of the events at 
CHK, testimony regarding rapes at Cyangugu Stadium was accepted as credible, 
thanks to Witnesses LBC and LAV, who gave consistent, corroborative accounts of 
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their own rapes. Both were able to name another rape victim, Fifi.
150
 Furthermore, 
Witness QBP’s testimony regarding a number of girls taken by soldiers and 
Interahamwe from the Eglise Episcopale au Rwanda (EER), who returned “in a 
pitiful state”, having difficulty walking, was also deemed credible. Witness QBP was 
able to identify three of them as the daughters of her neighbour, and name one as 
Suzanne.
151
 This provides a clear example of the extent of the evidence required for 
judges to find accusations of rape credible. 
The Chamber’s decision not to convict Nzuwonemeye and Sagahutu on the 
basis of the circumstantial evidence meant they were not convicted for rape at all. The 
only allegations of rape against them related to events at CHK. 
 
3.1.2.2   Inconsistencies and Lack of Eyewitnesses 
The Chamber also noted that Witness DAR’s evidence was inconsistent152 with his 
pre-trial statement and was reluctant to accept his evidence without corroboration 
from other witnesses. The inconsistencies did not relate to the alleged rapes but to i) 
killings of civilians by soldiers which, in his statement, he maintained he had 
witnessed, yet, during live testimony, denied having seen; ii) to the identity of dead 
bodies; and iii) to a misremembered date.
153
 These were enough to undermine his 
evidence and the Chamber did not consider him a credible witness. He also had no 
recollection of the arrival at CHK of the bodies of the Belgian UNAMIR soldiers who 
had been protecting Prime Minister Agathe Uwiligiyimana, before being captured, 
mutilated and murdered.
154
 The Chamber felt he should have remembered such a 
significant event. The inconsistencies and lack of corroboration from further 
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witnesses or victims led the Chamber to question whether he had actually been at the 
CHK on the dates he said. Witness ZA, the only other Prosecution witness who 
testified about events at CHK, did not testify about any rapes and provided indirect 
evidence as opposed to eyewitness testimony, which was insufficiently detailed to 
counter the more credible evidence of the defence witnesses.
155
  
For the Prosecution to furnish solid evidence of events at CHK, it would have 
needed to provide detailed and precise corroborative accounts of events from several 
sources, preferably from eyewitnesses, and its witnesses would have needed to be 
credible, with no inconsistencies in their accounts prior to and during trial. In cases 
where more than one eyewitness is available for cross-examination, the Chamber is 
more likely to accept prosecution evidence. Rapes of Tutsi women at the École des 
Sciences Infirmières, Kabgayi (ESI) were seen by Eyewitness EZ, and rapes at 
Musambira Commune Office and Dispensary were observed by three Eyewitnesses, 
DBH, DBA, DBB. The Chamber accepted these had taken place.
156
 Furthermore, 
inconsistencies in Witness DBB’s testimony regarding the number of people at the 
Gaserge roadblock were insufficient to undermine her credibility, because it was 
largely corroborated by Witness DBH.  The Chamber noted that “this variance may 
plausibly be explained by the difficulties of recalling traumatic events in precise detail 
years after those events occurred”.157 The inconsistencies in Witness DAR’s 
testimony could also have been due to the passage of time and post traumatic stress 
disorder, but clearly the judges did not feel they could justify their discretionary 
power to accept his evidence without corroboration. 
 
 
                                                 
155
 Ibid, paras. 1171, 1175. 
156
 Ibid, paras. 1180-1; 1185. 
157
 Ibid, para. 1190. 
 38 
3.1.3 Investigative Practices 
Witnesses highlighted poor investigative practices, which led to subsequent problems 
with evidence and testimony in court. 
Some inconsistencies between witnesses’ statements and their live testimony 
in court are blamed on misunderstandings between the witness and the ICTR 
investigators conducting the pre-trial interviews. For example, Witness DBJ gave 
evidence that a soldier raped a female refugee at the Josephite Brothers’ compound on 
8 April 1994. The Defence maintained that Witness DBJ testified to having seen the 
soldier rape the girl as he walked past the building where the soldier had taken her. 
However, in his pre-trial statement, Witness DBJ had stated that he saw the rape while 
he was sitting in the Josephite Brothers’ compound. According to Witness DBJ, the 
discrepancy was possibly the result of a misunderstanding between himself and the 
investigators, who may have misunderstood the passage in his statement where he 
said the soldier told the girl to undress at the compound, taking this to mean instead 
that the soldier raped her at the compound.
158
 The Chamber accepted Witness DBJ’s 
explanation as plausible and was satisfied he gave a credible account that a soldier 
raped a young girl during the attack at the Josephite Brothers compound on 8 April 
1994.
159
 However, in English law, a previous inconsistent statement – which is 
admissible as evidence of any matter stated of which oral evidence by the witness 
would be admissible
160
 – generally undermines the credibility of witnesses, because 
they are proffering to the court a different account to that asserted before in their 
written statement. The court may believe that, on one of these occasions, the witness 
must have been lying. It is therefore essential that investigators draft witness 
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statements accurately and ensure they have understood fully, via detailed questioning, 
the witness’ account.  
Investigators must also devote adequate time to conducting interviews. 
Although her testimony was believed by the Trial Chamber, inconsistencies arose 
between Witness LBC’s pre-trial statements and her live testimony. She ascribed 
these to the brevity of the interview. During her first interview, she did not tell 
investigators that her mother had been killed by Interahamwe outside Cyangugu 
stadium, maintaining the interview had not lasted long enough for her to provide a 
detailed account of the rapes, abductions, assassinations and escape attempts, taking 
place over several weeks.
161
 In the case of Witness LBC, her live testimony of the 
incident during which this massacre took place was corroborated by Witness LAV. 
The fact that their accounts were in general consistent bolstered their credibility.
162
 
Witness LBC, who testified during cross-examination that she herself had 
been the victim of multiple rapes at Cyangugu stadium, also explained that, when she 
was first interviewed, she had not told investigators about the rapes “because she was 
not brave enough at that time”.163 Witness DBD was also raped at the coffee co-
operative TRAFIPRO, but failed to report this to investigators.
164
 In both cases, the 
Prosecution was fortunate to have corroborative evidence from other witnesses, which 
ensured the witnesses’ live testimony was believed. However, following the 
revelations of the Akayesu trial, investigators should have known that many Tutsi 
women had suffered sexual violence, that they would be reluctant to talk about this 
due to the social stigma attached to such attacks, and to secure convictions for rape 
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and sexual violence, specific questions should have been put to them, sensitively, to 
enable them to divulge such attacks. 
 
 
4 Prosecution Procedure and its Shortcomings 
 
None of the incidents outlined above are features of Ndindiliyimana et al alone. 
Human rights organisations, international observers, witnesses and victims regularly 
complain of stumbling blocks to successful prosecution for crimes of sexual violence, 
despite the progress in defining rape and sexual violence. This section will examine 
some of the areas of recurrent criticism. 
 
4.1 Judges 
Like Catherine MacKinnon, SáCouto and Cleary, of the War Crimes Research Office 
at Washington College of Law, believe judges require a higher level of proof in cases 
of sexual violence than in other types of cases before the ad hoc tribunals. They claim 
that judges are “reluctant to draw meaningful inferences from circumstantial evidence 
and appear to prefer direct or more specific evidence as to knowledge or causality, 
even when such evidence is not required as a matter of law”,165 as we saw in 
Ndindiliyimana et al. Similarly, in Kajelijeli, witness testimonies provided strong 
circumstantial evidence that the accused authorised acts of sexual violence by his 
subordinates, but the Chamber required proof from the Prosecution that a specific 
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order had been issued to rape or sexually assault the victims on that day.
166
 SáCouto 
and Cleary maintain that:  
the jurisprudence of the ad hoc tribunals makes clear that an order, even if implicit, may be 
inferred from the circumstances, including from both acts and omissions of an accused. 
Unfortunately, while the ad hoc tribunals have used circumstantial or pattern evidence to 
establish that an accused ordered certain crimes, a review of sexual violence and gender-based 
cases before these tribunals indicates that they appear more reluctant to do so in these types of 
cases.
167
 
Attitudes in court have also given serious cause for concern. Nowrojee 
recounts how, in the Butare Trial,
168
 the judges burst out laughing as Witness TA, a 
victim of multiple rapes, was “ineptly and insensitively” cross-examined by a Defence 
lawyer. The witness had been hiding for days and not bathed. The implication was 
that she could not have been raped because she smelt. No apology was forthcoming 
from, nor admonishment administered to, the judges.
169
 This behaviour suggests a 
lack of gravity accorded to sexual violence offences and a misunderstanding of the 
probable purpose of the rapes – to eradicate an ethnic group – and could be attributed 
to the small numbers of women judges at the ICTR, although, in fact, judge Arlette 
Ramaroson sat in this Trial Chamber. As a result, in 2002, ten prosecution witnesses 
refused to testify before the same Chamber.
170
 
Furthermore, at the international tribunals, the attitudes of judges and 
prosecutors do not necessarily reflect a respect for women as equals, as the legislation 
and norms of the twenty-first-century western world demand. Xabier Aranburu, senior 
analyst at the Office of the Prosecutor at the ICC, recently gave a lecture to a group of 
experienced judges and prosecutors visiting The Hague where “references to sexual 
violence were met with laughter and mocking signs, and I was asked whether 
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international tribunals accepted female investigators, since apparently this was not an 
option in their country”.171 
Leading independent international organisation Human Rights Watch (HRW) 
signalled a number of issues to the UN Security Council in a letter in 2003. It 
criticised the judges’ lack of professionalism, maintaining some judges lacked 
experience in managing a courtroom, permitting lengthy and irrelevant examination 
of witnesses.
172
 HRW felt the need to recommend the recruitment of “highest quality 
staff”.  
At the ICTR and ICTY, when women judges have been present on the bench, 
Trial Chambers often seem to have been more determined to prosecute crimes of 
sexual violence. As we have seen, Judge Pillay was credited with taking the initiative 
to question witnesses about rape in Akayesu, which led to him being charged with 
sexual violence. Similary, at the ICTY, it was only on the insistence of Judge 
Elizabeth Odio Benito,
173
 who “publicly exhorted the Office of the Prosecutor”174 to 
include gender crimes in Dragan Nikolić’s indictment, that he was charged with and 
found guilty of sexual violence.
175
 Without their determination, it would seem quite 
probable that investigating crimes of sexual violence would have been even less of a 
priority for the tribunals. 
Judge Pillay supports the participation of women judges, “because of the 
principal of equality. You can’t keep fifty per cent of the population out of the 
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decision-making process. Then you have skewed justice”.176  She does not believe 
that women and men decide differently, but that women have more sensitivity about 
rape, as they understand what happens to women who are raped. Rape can genuinely 
constitute a death sentence for some, since, aside from those rape victims who died 
from the physical violence accompanying the rape acts, many of Rwanda’s rape 
victims contracted AIDS or became HIV positive, and also were psychologically 
affected, feeling deep shame or becoming outcast as a result. Arguably, this 
understanding will lead to greater sensitivity in managing the questioning of victims 
of sexual violence in court, and a determination to put crimes of sexual violence on an 
equal footing with other violent crimes.  
It appears also that women judges are more likely to impose harsher sentences 
for sexual offences. Nienke Grossman, Assistant Professor at the University of 
Baltimore School of Law, believes the sexes bring different perspectives to judging. A 
study of ICTY sentencing practices shows panels with female judges impose more 
severe sanctions on defendants who assault women, while male judges impose more 
severe sanctions on defendants who assault men: “Having a female judge on cases 
with female victims increases the sentences by about 46 months”.177 A recent survey 
of rulings in United States sex discrimination cases showed that a complainant was 
ten per cent less likely to win her case if the judge was male as opposed to female, 
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and that a woman’s presence on a judicial panel actually causes male judges to rule in 
favour of sex discrimination complainants.
178
 
Judge Patricia Wald, ICTY judge between 1999 and 2001, believes that the 
number of women judges at international tribunals is not adequate,
179
 with the 
exception of the ICC, whose statute mandates representation of women, and the 
Special Court for Sierra Leone, where four out of eleven judges are women. At the 
ICTR, only one female judge was appointed to the bench in 1996.
180
 In 2012, only 
three out of thirteen permanent judges and two out of eight ad litem judges were 
women.
181
 Women, very often the victims of horrendous war crimes, consequently 
have little role in the punishment of them, but have to content themselves with seeing 
them “disguised in international law linguistics … as outrages against dignity or 
honor”.182  
Article 12 ter (1) (b) of the ICTR statute includes a recommendation that 
States take into account the importance of a fair representation of female and male 
judges when proposing candidates as ad litem judges.
183
 
However, as Judge Wald points out, a balanced representation will only occur 
if national governments nominate women for possible selection by the international 
tribunals from amongst their legal professionals.
184
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At any event, as Grossman states, more research into how the representation of 
the sexes on the bench affects outcomes of trials is essential.
185
 The presence as one of 
three judges on the bench in the Ndindiliyimana et al trial of Taghrid Hikmat,
186
 the 
first woman judge in Jordan and the first Muslim woman judge at the ICTR, did not 
seem to have a particularly positive impact on prosecuting sexual violence in this case 
as only one of the accused was convicted of rape and on only one count. It may be 
that the indictment was so defective as to make conviction for sexual violence 
virtually impossible. In contrast, there were two female judges at the trial of Pauline 
Nyiramasuhuko, the first woman to be found guilty of rape in an international 
tribunal.
187
 In the 2012 case of Ildéphonse Nizeyimana, where there were no female 
judges on the bench, Nizeyimana, was found not guilty of the numerous rapes with 
which he was charged.
188
 It is not suggested that a conviction for crimes of sexual 
violence against women will only be made where women judges are on the bench, but 
rather that women judges may be likely to have a more dogged approach to dealing 
with these crimes than their male counterparts. As there are still so few women judges 
at the ICTR, many trials will inevitably take place with an all male bench. 
In her recent book Fact-Finding Without Facts: The Uncertain Evidentiary 
Foundations of International Criminal Convictions, Professor Nancy Combs, Director 
of the Human Security Law Centre, William and Mary Law School, Williamsburg, 
advocates judge education, to acquire a deeper understanding of the culture of the 
victims and defendants, referring to Australian criminal trials with Aboriginal 
witnesses “whose cultural attributes and communication style differ sharply from 
those of courtroom personnel”, and maintains that “Cultural training … can help 
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judges to place witness demeanour into an appropriate context and to better assess 
testimonial deficiencies”.189 
Such training would surely help judges manage more fairly the cross-
examination of vulnerable witnesses in court. In Combs’ experience, witnesses who 
have unsophisticated language skills, such as the unschooled or illiterate women 
amongst those testifying at the ICTR, have difficulty answering questions during 
cross-examination “because lawyers rarely modify the format and vocabulary of their 
cross-examination to take account of the witness’ language abilities”.190 Using 
double-negatives, multi-part questions, complex syntax and difficult vocabulary may 
destabilize witnesses and destroy their credibility. Furthermore, she maintains many 
ICTR judges are former academics or government officials who have no courtroom 
experience, or may “hail from new democracies and developing nations that do not 
boast centuries of commitment to due process norms”.191 It is reasonable to expect 
some robust form of continuing professional development for judges arriving at the 
ICTR in these circumstances.  
Regular site visits would also constitute a significant aid in understanding the 
context of the genocide, and would help fill information gaps created by unclear 
witness testimony with insufficient detail. In the Karera trial, a site visit enabled the 
judges to conclude that the prosecutor had not proved beyond reasonable doubt that 
Karera had observed a specific attack.
192
 Site visits also have the added advantage of 
increasing the trial’s profile locally, encouraging potential witnesses to come forward 
with information, and deter them from lying, since “If on-site visits were a customary 
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practice, witnesses would know that at least some portion of their stories would be 
personally verified”.193  
 
4.2 OTP Prosecutors 
Commentators have highlighted a number of deficiencies in the prosecution of sexual 
violence crimes at the ICTR but in Binaifer Nowrojee’s opinion, the responsibility for 
the poor conviction rates lies with the OTP: 
Given the overwhelming evidence of widespread sexual violence during the genocide, the lack 
of accountability for these crimes can only be attributed to the lack of a comprehensive strategy 
on the part of the Prosecutor’s Office to effectively investigate and prosecute these crimes.194 
 
International war crimes specialist Valerie Oosterveld talks of an “inconsistent 
prosecutorial focus” leading to inconsistent charging practices.195  She claims a lack 
of consistency leads investigators to gather too little or the wrong kind of evidence, 
the result being that this does not prove all elements of the crimes, so prosecutors: 
fail to keep track of the evidence over time; use inappropriate methodology; miss investigatory 
opportunities; and potentially create a disconnect between the charges in the indictment and 
what the prosecution can actually prove at trial, which results in the need to amend indictments, 
to drop charges, or leads to acquittals.
196
 
 
There are numerous occasions where the Prosecution withdraw charges of sexual 
violence before the trial: in Muvunyi,
197
 (for insufficiency of evidence) and 
Bisengimana,
198
 Nzabirinda,
199
 Rugambarara,
200
 and Serushago
201
 (as a result of plea 
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bargaining, in which the Accused pleaded guilty to other charges against him)
202
 and 
in Kajelijeli
203
 (the OTP missed the deadline to appeal against the acquittal on rape 
charges).
204
 This seems to demonstrate a lack of commitment to prosecute sexual 
violence, echoed by Aranburu’s experience at the ICTY. Two senior attorneys 
prevented him from including sexual violence charges in an indictment, claiming 
there was insufficient evidence; one subsequently explained that in his country he 
always avoided sexual violence because it was “very annoying and very difficult to 
prove”.205 
Four years after taking up office as ICTR Chief Prosecutor, Hassan Jallow set 
up a Committee for the Review of the Investigation and Prosecution of Sexual 
Violence in 2007, to tackle the worryingly low rate of conviction for crimes of sexual 
violence, which contrasted with the successful rates for other crimes at the Tribunal. 
The Committee compiled two reports on the past experiences of the OTP, before 
starting to implement strategies and procedures for the on-going prosecution of sexual 
violence, eventually producing a Best Practices Manual for the Investigation and 
Prosecution of Sexual Violence Crimes in Situations of Armed Conflict in 2008 (The 
Manual).
206
  
The Committee identified the following: the need to improve communications 
between investigation teams, OTP trial teams, Witnesses and Victims Support Section 
and the Registry’s gender adviser. It recommended staff-training (of lawyers and 
investigators), greater respect and support for victims and better preparation of 
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witnesses for trial. It advocated recruitment of more female staff, with attention to 
gender parity at senior levels.  
Yet, despite the work of the Committee, there still appears too often to be an 
imbalance in the representation of the sexes at the OTP. For example, there was only 
one woman in the five-strong prosecution team in the trial of Ndindiliyimana et al,
207
 
(only one successful prosecution for rape) and none at all in the Casimir Bizimungu et 
al trial
208
 (none of the four accused found guilty of rape) both completed in 2011. The 
OTP is clearly concerned that there may be a correlation between this under-
representation of women in the prosecution teams and the inadequate preparation of 
sexual violence charges. In contrast, in the case of  Pauline Nyiramasuhuko, the first 
woman to be convicted of rape by an international tribunal, there were five women on 
the team of prosecutors, a rare occurrence even now.
209
 
The Manual states that prosecutors and investigators should have a thorough 
understanding of the elements of the crimes to be proven to ensure victims are not 
unnecessarily asked to “recount very painful experiences unless there is a reasonable 
chance of obtaining a conviction for those crimes”,210 and reminds staff that 
corroboration of victims’ testimony is not required.211 It makes clear the responsibility 
of the OTP, even so far as emphasizing that prosecutors are tasked with  the heavy 
responsibility of directing the judges in court: “It is the Prosecutor’s responsibility to 
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monitor closely the scope of cross-examination in this regard and to bring these Rules 
to the Trial Chamber’s attention”.212 
Despite all these positive steps, and the fact that Bianchi does not believe 
sexual violence formed a “secondary category” at the ICTR, nonetheless, if the OTP 
had to make a choice, she admits that, in the past, a genocide charge would take 
priority over rape and sexual violence charges, due to limited resources. Sexual 
violence charges might be dropped or not pursued at all if they proved too complex to 
prosecute. She insists that at the OTP “we’re trying to make a difference in that 
now”.213 Special training from the outset is essential to overcome the difficulties of 
eliciting evidence. Worryingly, since entirely dependent on the luck of the draw, she 
says that, in successful sexual violence prosecutions, there was “always a prosecutor 
who was completely dedicated to the cause, who treated the victims in a way that 
gave the victim a lot of support while not invading her privacy”.214  
Chief Prosecutor Jallow believed that sexual violence offences should be ‘fast-
tracked’,  and dealt with ‘very early’ when victims still wanted justice. He felt that if 
there was delay, victims resettled, had families and simply did not wish to reopen an 
unpleasant chapter in their lives, but desired closure, which meant the OTP was 
unable to prosecute.
215
 Unfortunately, however, the OTP did not prioritise sexual 
violence prosecutions in the early days, and as we seen, prosecuting these offences 
eighteen years after they happened gives very mixed results. 
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4.3 OTP Investigators 
Regular criticisms have been made regarding investigators’ practices in collecting 
evidence from witnesses and victims. According to Oosterveld, in the early 
investigations, statements on sexual violence crimes were too ‘cursory,’ lacking 
important supporting evidence to prove the elements of crimes, because investigators 
and prosecuting lawyers did not work in close collaboration. Sexual violence charges 
then either had to be dropped or new evidence collected hurriedly for trial.
216
  
The shortage of evidence is attributed to various factors.  A lack of sensitivity 
on the part of investigators, due to the absence of female investigators
217
 (until 1998, 
the ICTR employed only male investigators
218
), the lack of investigators with relevant 
experience, and the use of poorly-designed interviews were highlighted. Richard 
Goldstone (Chief Prosecutor, 1994-96) highlighted a ‘gender bias’ at the OTP in the 
1990s, with large numbers of investigators, mainly police and army officers, seconded 
to the ICTR from all over the world, whose “culture was not such as to make them 
concerned about gender-related crime”.219  
Some witnesses have even found genocide suspects employed by the ICTR as 
defence investigators. Survivor organisations Ibuka and AVEGA denounced fourteen 
ICTR defence investigators as genocide suspects, including Joseph Nzabarinda (in 
Sylvain Nsabimana’s defence team), accused of rape and convicted of murder as a 
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crime against humanity in 2007.
220
 Survivors say such ICTR employees regularly 
‘leaked’ information covered by professional secrecy to suspects and their families, 
with the result that prosecution witnesses and their relatives were hounded from their 
homes, or even died in mysterious circumstances.
221
 There have also been accusations 
of investigators “watering down” testimonies,222 of nepotism and racism in the 
recruitment of defence investigators and of offers of bribes to testify for one side or 
the another.
223
 
Indeed, the poor performance of investigators, who are sometimes called to 
the stand to testify about the procedures they followed in gathering statements, is 
reported in the Judgments: in Ndindabahizi, investigators investigating the deaths of 
two victims, Mukantabana and Nyiramaritete, did not realise that Mukantabana was 
an alias for Nyiramaritete;
224
 On one occasion, investigators failed to attribute 
statements to the statement-maker correctly.
225
 Similarly, in Akayesu, identical 
statements purportedly from Witness DIX and her younger brother Witness DJX were 
prepared and submitted by the Defence team.
226
  
In the early days of the ICTR, when the tribunal was criticised for its 
slowness, performance reviews were based on the number of statements an 
investigator took, with renewal of contract dependent on productivity,
227
 and it is not 
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difficult to see that this could easily lead to hastily conducted interviews and 
inadequate detail. 
Combs states that, although investigators probably do not make as many 
mistakes as witnesses claim, errors occur: 
Interviews with ICTR…investigators generate off-the-record stories of investigators who at best 
lack an adequate understanding of the conflict they are investigating and the culture and habits 
of the people who are to be witnesses, and who at worst are lazy and/or incompetent.
228
 
 
She suggests taping interviews, a practice which has been adopted by the 
Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia,
229
 whose Internal Rules go so far 
as to provide that, when a suspect is questioned, the interview should be audio- or 
video-recorded if necessary. Judges may extend this to the questioning of anyone 
appearing before them, in particular “where the use of such procedures could assist in 
reducing any subsequent traumatisation of a victim of sexual or gender violence”.230  
If it is impracticable to produce a taped interview, a written transcript would 
be beneficial. The format of written witness statements at the ICTR was debated in 
2004. The Niyitegeka Trial Chamber noted that neither ICTR nor ICTY had provided 
a clear definition of the term ‘statement.’231 The Appeals Chamber outlined an ideal 
record of a witness interview as: 
…composed of all the questions that were put to a witness and of all the answers given by the 
witness. The time of the beginning and the end of an interview, specific events such as requests 
for breaks, offering and accepting of cigarettes, coffee and other events that could have an 
impact on the statement or its assessment should be recorded as well.
232
 
 
The interview should be recorded in a language the witness understands, the witness 
should read or have it read out to him or her, make any corrections necessary, sign it 
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to attest to its truthfulness and correctness. Finally, it should be signed by the 
investigator and interpreter.
233
 
The Chamber felt it might be impossible to assess the probative value of 
witnesses’ answers without knowledge of the questions posed, and that the Chamber 
would have greater difficulty assessing the credibility of witnesses and the reliability 
of their testimony without a detailed record of their interviews. The Chamber 
concluded: 
The record of the first interview with a witness is of the highest value because it is most likely to 
capture the witness’s recollection accurately, being closest in time to the events and less 
vulnerable to any subsequent influence.
234
 
 
Subsequent to the Niyitegeka Appeals Chamber remarks, the OTP has not changed the 
format of its witness statements, and it appears that most statements remain a 
summary of the information witnesses provide to investigators, without including the 
questions asked or other explanatory narrative detailing the circumstances in which 
the statement was taken.
235
 Where inconsistencies arise between pre-trial statements 
and witness testimony in court, Trial Chambers continue to place more weight on oral 
testimony – which is now given many years after the events – than on written 
statements. Trial Chambers minimise the discrepancies with pre-trial statements, 
which are attributed to poor interviewing techniques adopted by investigators. Were 
the ICTR able to rely on effectively-collected, accurate data, divergent accounts could 
provide a “valuable mechanism for assessing witness credibility”236 at the ICTR,  
where false testimony is, unfortunately, rife. 
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As the ICTR relies on UN member states to provide investigators,
237
 it is 
especially important to have procedures in place to ensure investigators, who come 
from widely different backgrounds, know exactly what is required of them and all 
follow similar practices. To tackle this, in 2010 the ICTR began work on an 
International Prosecutors’ Best Practice Manual for Investigation and Prosecution of 
International Crimes, which was due for completion by mid-2011,
238
 somewhat late in 
the day to be of great use to the ICTR, which should have completed all cases by 
2014.
239
 The ICTR’s Best Practices Manual for Sexual Violence Crimes240  
recommends investigators be provided with a model questionnaire and a model 
witness statement to ensure evidence is correctly documented – this is surely a bare 
minimum in such circumstances.
241
  
There have also been geographical impracticalities. The investigations 
division, initially entirely based in Rwanda, was separated from the prosecution team 
which was based in Arusha.
242
 Some investigators working on trials with multiple 
defendants have been relocated to Arusha, where they work alongside prosecutors,
243
 
but investigators working on single-accused trials remain in Kigali, close to the crime 
scene. However, for the remaining trials before the ICTR, the OTP is moving away 
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from lengthy and cumbersome trials involving multiple defendants and many 
witnesses in favour of single-accused trials. The investigations team will no longer be 
split, but, based in Kigali, will once more be separated from the prosecutors,
244
 who 
operate from Arusha. It remains to be seen how successfully investigators and 
prosecutors will be able to liaise in these conditions.  
 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
There is now legislation in place to prosecute rape and sexual violence committed 
during the Rwandan genocide as acts of genocide, crimes against humanity or 
outrages upon personal dignity, and case law has given clarification as to the elements 
of these offences. The conceptual definition of rape provided by the Akayesu Trial 
Chamber was a significant development in the prosecution of crimes of sexual 
violence at the ICTR, likewise the presumption that the surrounding circumstances of 
conflict are coercive and generally eliminate the necessity for prosecutors to disprove 
that the victim consented to the sex act. The return to a mechanical definition of rape 
means proving rape is more complex, in theory, although this does not appear to be 
the principal stumbling block to successful prosecution; there is a high burden of 
proof on the prosecution to prove rape, and Trial Chambers are reluctant to accept 
uncorroborated accounts of rape, despite being permitted to do so.  
Cases such as Ndindiliyimana et al provide examples of barriers to successful 
convictions. We see evidence of indictments inaccurately and imprecisely drafted, and 
hear of insufficient time, care and expertise given to obtaining detailed witness 
statements. Inconsistencies arise between witness statements and live testimony in 
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court. Eyewitnesses and corroborative accounts to boost witness credibility have often 
not been available. It has been argued that judges do not have the same respect for 
crimes of sexual violence as for other offences. This has led to poor conviction rates 
for charges of rape and sexual violence, and a general impression that sexual violence 
crimes are considered less important than other offences. 
Although the ICTR has now commenced its completion strategy prior to 
transferring jurisdiction to Rwandan national courts, the issues investigated here are 
still relevant. Thirty-four accused are on trial at first instance and appeal or are at 
large.
245
 Many of the indictments for these cases contain counts for rape. The ICTR 
therefore still has reason to be diligent in ensuring that indictments have been drafted 
correctly, charges worded precisely and evidence gathered and presented effectively, 
so that a full and accurate case can be brought against those still to appear on counts 
of rape and sexual violence.  
Françoise Ngendahayo, former ICTR adviser on gender and victim assistance, 
recounts her memories of a witness in the Akayesu trial, whom she visited afterwards 
as she lay dying, to take her the French version of the Judgment. Ngendahayo 
explains: 
her reaction was contrary to my expectation. I thought she would say, “I don’t need this. I need 
to survive.” She told me, “Thank you. Now that I have this judgment, even if I’m unable to read 
French…, I will put it under my pillow and sleep on it until I die.”246 
 
This is how important it is for Rwandan victims of rape and sexual violence to see 
justice delivered. Ngendahayo’s hope, finally, is that the achievements of the ICTR 
and other international criminal tribunals will “instill a fear of justice” and that it will 
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genuinely be a case of plus jamais ça 
247
 for sexual violence offences as much as for 
any others. 
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 Plus jamais ça – Never again.  
